Proletarian Power — -Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution
Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun , Westview Press 1997
This is a fascinating and detailed account. According to the authors, Shanghai was unique in that after the very beginning of the Cultural Revolution (CR), “ worker rebels” dominated over student Red Guards. This makes sense in that Shanghai was the most industrialized city in China. Though the CR officially lasted from 1966 to 1976, the mass action phase of it was over by 1968.( 163)
Some analysts have said that the “Shanghai Commune” was similar to the Paris Commune in that the working class took political power in the city. This account rejects that analysis. The CR started as a power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party(CCP).Mao had been sidelined and wanted to make a comeback. He fomented mass opposition to his opponents in the CCP bureaucracy.
The CCP was the political organization of the state capitalist ruling class of China. This is not to deny that masses of workers and students took sides in the faction fight in the CCP. Indeed, there were vicious physical fights in which large numbers were killed and injured. During the course of the CR in Shanghai alone 169,000 people were investigated and 5000 lost their lives . This was especially concentrated in the “Cleansing Ranks” campaign which began in November 1967 ( 172)
However, from this book’s perspective, there was no mass independent political working-class movement within the CR. Instead, workers took one side or the other. The dominance of Mao Tse Tung prevailed throughout the CR, 1966–76.
The only exception to lack of working class independence was the class struggle around the “winds of economism”. Workers used the turmoil to fight for labor demands — wages and working conditions. They used the campaign against low level bureaucrats as a way to press their demands. These struggles primarily involved lower paid workers, especially migrant workers who had less rights than resident workers. In some cases, they were at least temporarily successful (108). There were important struggles for housing, including occupations (111). Both rebel and conservative workers pressed economic demands ( 111)
Both sides in the intra-CCP struggle denounced “economism”. This misuse of the term economism is an example of the corruption of Marxist ideas by the CCP. Lenin in the early 1900’s in Russia denounced economism because it limited the workers’ horizons to workplace issues. He supported the workers’ struggles for economic change. He rejected economism only because it prevented workers from also engaging politically.
In contrast to Lenin’s position, during the CR, both sides of the CP wanted to increase the exploitation of the working class. They opposed “economism” because they opposed working class struggle to get back more of what they created. If anything, Mao despite professed support for egalitarianism ,was more opposed to material incentives than the other side of the CR struggle. Despite the unified opposition from the CP, workers were able to make some gains during the CR while often losing economically at first.
Although neither CP faction represented the interests of workers or peasants , opposition to the prevailing system was the fuel of mass involvement in the CR. Workers were dissatisfied with their lives and signed up with either faction as a way to improve their conditions. In some cases , this took the route of “economism”. Sometimes “economism” overlapped with fighting for one faction or the other.
The authors focus on the personalities of various leaders. They examine the worker rebels vs the conservatives. The worker rebels often had pre-CR grievances and used the CR to advance their position individually or collectively. Perry and Li Xun emphasize the individual psychology of each leader as the fundamental source of their activity. The authors also stress that the leaders of the worker rebels came from north China and represented a shift away from dominance of those from south China.
These psychological and sociological considerations are interesting specifics but miss the overall picture. They also reflect a long-standing debate among historians. Though individual psychology plays a role in specific instances, the overall economic and political picture is more important.
The CR did not happen because of the psychology of individual leaders. Even the faction fight initiated by Mao did not come primarily from his personal attributes. After the Great Leap Forward, the CCP faced a crisis of accumulation. Different sections of the bureaucracy had different strategies. Mao’s wing which wanted to motivate the working class and peasantry with moral/political incentives felt it was losing out. To do that, Mao et. al. had to whip up political opposition to the “capitalist roaders” to give a political incentive for mass activity. This is why Mao launched the CR.
Individuals responded to this faction fight out of their own situation and psychology. In particular cases worker rebel leaders had been passed over for promotion or had other grievances.
“ Like previous campaigns of the PRC, the Cultural Revolution offered an opportunity for heretofore frustrated or obscure workers to rise on the basis of political activism” (64)
They likely had the same situation and psychology in 1965 as in 1966, yet the CR only broke out in ’66.
The authors give an excellent blow by blow account of the various stages in the struggle in Shanghai, including the tactics employed by different factions. Conservatives were allied with the anti-Mao wing. When they were defeated, struggles broke out among the worker rebels. Usually, a final verdict my Mao was enough to settle disputes.
“ Had Chairman Mao not intervened to indicate his personal support for the rebels’ assault …the Scarlet Guards ( conservatives who supported the pre-CR party leadership SL) would have undoubtedly emerged victorious.” (95)
This again reinforces the analysis that the CR was a faction fight within the CCP rather than an independent working class struggle.
Even the “January Revolution” in 1967 was not an overthrow of the CCP. It was instead a purge of some elements of the bureaucracy and a replacement with some new bureaucrats, sometimes from the working class. These new officials from the working class did not represent the working class. The Shanghai Commune that resulted from this “ revolution” did not reflect the democratic power of the working class. It was formed by different organizations with un-elected leaders. This was a common theme throughout the CR: direct democratic control of leaders, especially government leaders was never a dominant principle. Mao called for the Shanghai Commune to be called the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee and this was readily adopted by the SC leaders. This again shows the top down nature of the movement.
“ Eager to put an end to the “ winds of economism” and to establish some semblance of government authority in the city , Zhang ( leader of the “Shanghai Commune” SL) was willing to restrict worker participation in favor of a more orderly process. As Andrew Walder has argued, “The January Revolution was not a power seizure by workers’ organizations.. but an effort organized. to bring mass political action under control and to restore the normal operations of the Shanghai economy.” (126)
Even nominal working class representation in the Shanghai Commune was quite limited — of 19 leaders were from the Workers General Headquarters (150). Mao’s formula for containing the changes of the CR was the “triple combination”: representation from mass organizations, old cadres ,and military cadres ( 151). This gave 2/3 dominance to representatives of the ruling class. Even the 1/3 was questionable since the mass organizations were aligned with Mao’s faction of the ruling class. The WGH took over and became the Socialist Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) which was even less committed to defending working class interests than the old SFTU though it was more autonomous from the DCCP( 165).
Worker influence was limited by the continued domination of the CCP:
“Only party members could gain decision making authority within leading organizations, but the great majority of worker rebels were not party members at the onset of the CR. Admission to the Party thus became their most pressing demand..”(159)
By the end of the CR and especially after, many of the ousted bureaucrats were rehabilitated. The purpose of the CR was never to overthrow the ruling class of China. It was always to purge the bureaucracy and win dominance of one wing of the ruling class. In the end, even the ousted bureaucrats got with the new program and came back in.
The history of the CR again shows the importance of socialism from below. Working-class self-emancipation is NOT the same as putting even an abundance of people from working class backgrounds into bureaucratic positions. If the working class does not collectively control government officials , those officials will not champion the needs of the working class ! This means that the right of immediate recall first widely used during the Paris Commune is absolutiely essential. Workers also need to have the political freedom to form parties and campaign on specific issues that they can be held accountable on.
Even in private capitalism, any number of individual workers rise to more prominent positions in politics, economics, or both. Politicians are always campaigning on their humble origins. While not completely irrelevant, class origin is not decisive. Often people who have risen from working class positions are better able to sell anti-working class politics than those who were born rich.
Another lesson of the CR is the need for clear politics based on class interest. The campaign of Mao against his opponents was not rooted in class interests. It was only based on vague strategic differences within the ruling class over how best to accumulate capital. People often thought they were fighting for one thing but were actually fighting for something else.
Of course, when the CR ended, the winds shifted again. The Gang of Four were ousted and many of their allies suffered. After an interim, Deng Shao Ping came in with an openly “ capitalist road”. The similarities between the different strategies of the CCP outweighed the differences. They all relied on intensified exploitation of workers in the service of capital accumulation. How these strategies played out had tremendous impact on individuals and sectors of the population. However, the working class as a whole never had a horse in the race.
Very interesting, useful analysis of worker organizing during the CR! Though the analysis is off, it gives an abundance of information for a better understanding of the Cultural Revolution!
